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What Happens to Wages after Displacement?
E
conomic shocks and policy reforms can induce large changes in
establishment-level employment. Since wage losses from displace-
ment can be large and long-lasting, policymakers often express a
desire to support displaced workers. When resources are limited, policy-
makers need to target support to the workers who need it most.
But the academic literature offers little guidance on how to do this.
There is little agreement on how wages change after displacement. The
influential works of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan document large ad-
verse effects of displacement on workers in the United States.1 Subsequent
studies also find that displacement has significant long-term adverse
effects.2 More recent international comparisons, however, find zero or
positive wage changes following displacement. Abbring and others find
no change in wages in the United States, and Bender and others find pos-
itive wage changes following displacement in France and Germany.3
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1. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b).
2. Most studies focus on the United States, including Caballero, Engle, and Haltiwanger
(1997), Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), Stevens (1995, 1997), Revenga, Riboud, and Tan
(1994), and Marcal (2001). Others focus on other developing countries, such as Menezes-
Filho (2004), Burda and Mertens (2001), Couch (2001), Fallick (1996), Kletzer (1998), and
Ruhm (1991a, 1991b).
3. Abbring and others (2002); Bender and others (2002).
The literature also offers conflicting explanations of why these esti-
mates vary. Kuhn suggests that differences in inequality and institutions
in France, Germany, and the United States can explain the different es-
timates for these countries.4 Alternatively, Howland and Peterson, Car-
rington, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, and Farber suggest that labor
market conditions can affect postdisplacement wages.5 Since a wide vari-
ation in displacement costs makes targeting aid difficult, the efficiency gains
from identifying determinants of postdisplacement wages are potentially
significant.
This paper studies the Mexican labor market to contrast various expla-
nations for differences in postdisplacement wage changes. We hope to
identify patterns that may help policymakers target aid to displaced work-
ers. An environment with varying temporal and regional economic condi-
tions and with economic conditions and institutions substantially different
from those in the countries previously studied is ideally suited to identify
such patterns. If institutions vary little across regions, then the institutional
hypothesis would be an unlikely explanation of differences across regions
in postdisplacement wages.
Mexico meets these conditions. Differences between Mexico and other
countries, as well as differences within Mexico over time and space, can
help us identify these patterns in postdisplacement wage changes. First,
wage dispersion is higher in Mexico than in France, Germany, or the United
States.6 If inequality drives differences in postdisplacement wages, then
Mexican workers should have much more negative postdisplacement ex-
periences than observed in these countries.
Second, institutions such as workers’ separation costs, the legislated
costs of displacement (to the firm), and unions are very different in Mexico
than in other countries. Mexican workers are much less likely to leave firms
voluntarily than workers in other countries, which suggests that they have
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4. Kuhn (2002).
5. Howland and Peterson (1988); Carrington (1993); Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993b, chap. 6); Farber (2003). When examining local labor market conditions, Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993b) compare two Pennsylvania regions over the same time
period. Carrington (1993) and Howland and Peterson (1988) provide much wider geo-
graphic coverage, but these studies are not directly comparable to Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan because they use cross-section data that are subject to recall error rather than track-
ing the actual wages of workers over time.
6. The Deininger and Squire data set (available at www.worldbank.org/research/
growth/dddeisqu.htm) shows that Mexico’s historically averaged Gini coefficient (52.92) is
higher than that of the United States (35.79), France (37.71), and Germany (32.91).
higher separation costs. Mexico’s mandatory severance pay is higher than
what is legislated in France, Germany, and the United States (the latter two
have no legislated severance pay). Unions also have much less wage-setting
power in Mexico than in the comparison countries, which can lead to neg-
ative union-wage differentials.7 If unions explain the difference in results
across countries, then Mexican workers should have much more negative
postdisplacement experiences than is the case elsewhere.
Third, Mexico’s geographic regions exhibit little variation in unioniza-
tion and inequality, but large differences in economic conditions.8 Mexi-
can labor laws regarding severance payments, strikes, prohibitions against
nominal wage reductions, the legal recourses of workers in case of unfair
treatment, and guarantees of profit sharing are determined at the federal
level and therefore do not vary across regions. Moreover, no important
labor market reforms occurred in the period we study.
In short, we use this variation in economic conditions (but not institu-
tions) to compare local labor market conditions and postdisplacement wages
over time and space. Since inequality and institutions vary less within
Mexico than across the countries previously studied in the literature,
heterogeneity in postdisplacement wages within Mexico probably cannot
be explained by inequality and institutions. This points instead toward an
important role for labor market conditions. At the same time, our results
help explain the variation found in the literature. It thus seems very likely
that they can be applied beyond Mexico to target aid to displaced workers
when and where it is most needed.
Our approach differs from previous studies in two key ways. First, we
use a very simple, but formal, theoretical framework that illustrates how
differences in institutions, such as separation costs for both the firm and
the worker, play a key role in the postdisplacement experience. The model
also shows how a displaced worker might earn higher wages after being
displaced and yet not have wanted to leave the original job in search of
higher wages prior to displacement. More important, the model shows
how unemployment rates (through time) and differences in economic activ-
ity (through space) can lead to negative, zero, or positive postseparation
wage changes.9 Second, we employ a near-census-sized administrative data
set that allows us to directly compare displacement experiences across time
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7. Panagides and Patrinos (1994).
8. On unionization, see Fairris and Levine (2004).
9. The model also shows how the comparison group plays a key role, as Kuhn (2002)
suggests.
and regions. Since we want our results to be as directly comparable with
previous studies as possible, we use the methodological “gold standard”
established by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan.10 We use the same stan-
dards as in previous studies to identify displaced workers, match workers
to firms, and track workers as they move between firms. We are therefore
able to avoid the so-called recall bias from displaced-worker surveys and
directly compare our results with earlier studies.
In line with the model, we find that different external conditions can
cause wages to go up, go down, or stay constant after displacement. Work-
ers who are displaced during good times experience higher wages than non-
displaced workers (including both nondisplaced workers who remained
employed in firms that underwent large employment contractions and non-
displaced workers who never worked in these firms), while workers dis-
placed in bad times can experience very large losses.11 Furthermore, the
effects of separating in bad times linger: workers who separate when un-
employment is high never seem to catch up to workers who separate when
unemployment is low. This effect is most pronounced in relatively less
economically dynamic geographic regions.
Our basic results are robust to the effects of age, attrition, tenure, and
switching sectors. Like previous studies, we find that displaced workers
with longer tenure experience larger losses than workers with shorter tenure
in some periods but not others. Variation in economic conditions through
time may therefore explain why Kreichel and Pfann argue that tenure does
not account for observed wage differences, while other studies, such as
Carrington, support the tenure explanation.12 We also find effects of chang-
ing sectors that are similar to previous studies. Our main conclusion is that
changing local labor market conditions produce a wide range of displace-
ment effects and therefore might be the key to understanding when dis-
placement hurts workers.
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10. For example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a) analyze the effects of dis-
placement on workers using matched firm-worker data from the United States. Their results
suggest that workers begin to experience falling wages before they are displaced and that earn-
ings recovery may take more than five years. Hamermesh (1989) and Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) show that adjustment costs at the firm level are generally nonlinear and significantly
affect employment decisions. Other studies examine earnings losses before displacement
(de la Rica, 1995) and how changing labor market conditions affect displacement (Stevens,
2001; Clark, Herzog, and Schlottmann, 1998; Helwig, 2001).
11. We find loss levels that are very similar to those documented by Jacobson, LaLonde,
and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b).
12. Kreichel and Pfann (2003); Carrington (1993).
We present our analysis in five sections. We start by presenting our sim-
ple theoretical framework. The subsequent section describes the source,
collection, and limitations of our data, discusses the Mexican economic
environment, defines the term displaced worker, and finally describes the
various comparison groups. We then explain our empirical approach and
present our results. A final section concludes.
Theory
This section illustrates how differences in economic conditions can result
in either an increase or a decrease in wages following displacement. The
model modifies McLaughlin’s theory of quits and layoffs by incorporating
a separation cost that the worker bears in the case of a quit but that the firm
pays to the worker in the case of a layoff.13 We present the model in its
simplest form to illustrate the concepts that guide our empirical work.
Workers receive a wage, w, and produce value to the firm, W. We
assume that the value to the firm is a function denoted W(X, G) in which X
represents worker-specific characteristics and G represents firm-specific
characteristics, including the firm’s output price and productivity shocks.
Workers have the ability to search on the job. Denote as E(r) the expected
value of an outside wage offer from a firm that values the worker at R. We
assume the outside offer is costlessly verifiable once it is made, and that
the expected value of the offer is a function of external characteristics,
including the number of firms that value the worker’s skills (following
Stevens), the unemployment rate (which reduces the expected value), and
the economic activity in the region (which increases the expected value).14
We employ McLaughlin’s important distinction between layoffs and
quits. McLaughlin defines a quit as the result of a firm-refused, worker-
initiated attempt to increase wages and a layoff as the result of a firm-
initiated, worker-refused attempt to lower wages. Firms (workers) have
the option to accept proposals for changes in the wage, and they will do so
as long as the value of the wage is not larger (smaller) than the value of the
output to the firm, or the reservation wage. We modify McLaughlin’s model
by adding a separation cost. The separation cost may stem from the loss of
shared surplus from firm-specific training, an institutional arrangement that
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13. McLaughlin (1991).
14. Stevens (1994).
encourages long-term employment, or other reasons.15 The relevant char-
acteristic is that this cost is paid to the worker in the event of a layoff. This
is particularly relevant for the Mexican case, because Mexico, like some
European and many Latin American countries, follows a more preventa-
tive stance.16 Article 50 of the Mexican Federal Labor Law mandates that
workers hired for an indefinite period who are laid off (without cause) are
entitled to twenty days pay for each year of service.17 This mandate may
significantly increase the cost of separation in Mexico.18
The effect of this type of legislation on employment flows is still under
debate.19 One particularly relevant study argues that this kind of legislation
in Brazil creates the incentive for workers to negotiate with firms to make
quits look like layoffs, in order to receive this payment.20 This behavior
creates a procyclical turnover pattern, because workers may be particu-
larly interested in getting their separation payment in good times to start
new businesses or invest in areas with higher returns. Kaplan, Martínez
González, and Robertson examine job creation and job destruction in
Mexico.21 They find that the pattern of job destruction—especially the
component that is due to contraction (layoffs)—is weakly counter cycli-
cal. Over the 1986–2001 period, the component of job destruction stem-
ming from firm contraction moved negatively with the net growth rate of
employment. We are therefore confident that the kind of adverse incen-
tives and false layoffs documented in Brazil do not affect our results.22
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15. Hashimoto (1979, 1981).
16. Kuhn (2002).
17. This provision applies to contracts of indefinite length. The United States and
Germany have no legislated severance pay, although in the United States the industry stan-
dard is one to two weeks per year of service and in Germany severance pay is generally
included in the social plan. In France, workers with more than two years of service receive
0.1 months of salary per year of service (Kuhn, 2002).
18. McLaughlin’s (1991) analysis of data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) suggests that separations in the United States are evenly divided between quits and
layoffs. Mexicans, in contrast, are much less likely to leave voluntarily, which may imply a
larger separation cost. See figure 3.
19. See Heckman and Pagés (2000) and Robertson and Dutkowsky (2002) for examples
of estimates of labor market adjustment costs in Latin America and a discussion of their link
to labor market legislation.
20. Gonzaga (2003).
21. Kaplan, Martínez González, and Robertson (2004).
22. We do not claim that this behavior does not occur in Mexico or that these concerns
are not relevant for Mexico. The aggregate statistics, however, seem to suggest that such
behavior does not have a significant effect on our results.
The worker’s decision rule is most clearly illustrated graphically, as
seen in figure 1. Given an initial wage of w, the worker will voluntarily
leave the firm as long as the expected wage, E(r), minus the separation
cost, C, is greater than the current wage. In figure 1, all workers with
wages in region IV will quit and seek employment elsewhere. Workers
with wages in regions I, II, and III will remain in the firm. The separation
cost will lead some workers to remain in the firm even if they have higher
expected wages elsewhere (as shown in region III).
Now consider the effect of an adverse shock that lowers the worker’s
value to the firm from w to w′. Such an adverse shock could stem from an
adverse productivity or price shock or from some other factor. In this case,
the firm will offer the worker a wage reduction, which the worker can
either accept or reject. If the worker accepts the lower wage, the worker
remains with the firm; if the worker refuses the wage cut, the worker is laid
off. According to Mexican law, the worker must receive a separation pay-
ment, which is presumably intended to compensate the worker for the
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F I G U R E  1 . Worker’s Decision Rule
separation. The effect of this payment means that workers with expected
wages above the new wage, w′, will be laid off. Some of those workers will
receive lower wages than in their prior employment (workers with
expected wages in region II), but other workers will now take jobs with
higher wages (workers with expected wages in region III). Workers with
wages in regions II and III will both have higher postdisplacement wages
than workers in the same firm (region I).
The effect of displacement on wages is therefore ambiguous: wages
may either rise or fall after displacement. Wages may go up because the
separation cost keeps workers from voluntarily moving to take advantage
of higher potential wages in other firms. This result illustrates why a
worker who involuntarily separates from a firm may have higher wages
after separating, while lacking the incentive to take a higher-paying job
(before incurring the separation cost) prior to being displaced.
For a given level of separation costs, the value of wages in other jobs
(that is, the expected value of the outside offers) depends on several factors.
If labor markets are not perfect and worker experience is valued outside a
single firm, then increasing the number of firms that value the worker’s
experience or that would compete for workers will drive up the outside
wage offers into region III.23 Alternatively, a higher unemployment rate
reduces the expected value of wage offers into region II, which implies
that displaced workers would tend to enter firms with lower wages. The
model thus illustrates that the heterogeneity of results found in the litera-
ture (negative, zero, and positive) is consistent with a simple theory and
that this heterogeneity can be linked to institutions and labor market con-
ditions in ways that can be empirically compared.
When assessing a theoretical framework such as this one, it is useful to
consider alternative explanations that may generate similar results. Most
theory in this literature focuses on explanations for lower postdisplacement
wages. Suggestions include loss of firm-specific capital and seniority.
These concepts can be easily incorporated into the model above, but they
offer little guidance for the case of higher postdisplacement wages. Higher
postdisplacement wages are somewhat more difficult to reconcile if work-
ers can move to higher paying jobs. This argument, however, assumes that
moving is basically costless. As explained above, a positive moving cost
directly addresses this concern. Furthermore, the model described above
differs from previous approaches that focus on either positive or negative
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23. See Stevens (1994).
wage changes because it shows how differing labor market conditions
could generate either positive or negative postdisplacement wages.
The Data
Mexican labor laws require all private sector firms to report wage and
employment information on all employees to the Mexican Social Security
Institute (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, or IMSS). In practice, how-
ever, firms report information on roughly half the private sector employees.
Firms may choose not to formally register in order to evade taxes and social
security contributions. Academic studies of Mexico’s informal sector use
the act of reporting to the IMSS as a criterion for formal sector participation.
The IMSS records thus represent a census of private firms in the formal sec-
tor of the Mexican economy.24 Our data come directly from these records.
The IMSS data are collected at the firm level rather than at the estab-
lishment level. Each formal sector firm in Mexico has a firm identifier
called its registro patronal. The registro patronal is similar to the employer
identification number (EIN) that is commonly used as a firm identifier in
U.S. data sets. Just as several subsidiary EINs in the United States might be
owned by one parent firm, several registros patronales might be owned by
the same parent company in Mexican data. The registro patronal may
incorporate more than one establishment in a single firm (again like EIN in
U.S. data), but in almost all cases, we identify individual establishments (or
plants in the case of manufacturing industries). We use the registro patro-
nal to link observations over time, to follow workers as they move among
firms, and to track workers’ wages within their given firm over time.25
As an initial check of data quality, we compare our sample with official
IMSS employment statistics. The motivation behind this comparison is
that the IMSS reports formal employment statistics based on their data,
which are used as an indicator of Mexican employment, but their method
for calculating these statistics is not known to us. A favorable comparison
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24. Public sector workers and members of the military have social security accounts
with other agencies.
25. Firms could potentially change their registros patronales from time to time for
administrative reasons, and this would generate false births and deaths stemming from
changes in the registro patronal for continuing firms. In practice, however, very few firms
(fewer than four) closed entirely and opened again in the next quarter with the same employ-
ees. These firms were dropped from the sample.
with official statistics would indicate that we have a reliable data set, and
in fact the figures match up quite well in a comparison with data from offi-
cial IMSS statistics.26
Our data represent all sectors of the Mexican economy.27 To verify cov-
erage, we compared the 1993 average employment in manufacturing in our
data (2,958,715.5) with the 1993 average total employment in the 1993 Mex-
ican Industrial Census (3,246,039.0). Our data thus cover about 91.1 percent of
total manufacturing employment. This leads us to conclude that the distinc-
tion between formal and informal labor markets, which is so important in
developing economies, is mainly an issue outside the manufacturing sector.
Since our data are effectively a census of formal sector employment, we
are particularly concerned about the rate of attrition in our sample. Work-
ers may leave our sample for three reasons: they may leave the labor force,
become unemployed, or enter the informal sector. To get a sense of the
rate of attrition in our sample, we focus on workers who worked at least
one quarter in 1993. Of these workers, 78 percent worked at least once in
1994, and 57 percent worked at least once in 2000. About 87 percent of the
workers who appear in our sample for at least one quarter in 1993 appear
in our sample for at least one quarter between 1994 and 2000.
Analytically, treating workers who leave the labor force or become un-
employed is straightforward. The complication in our data arises because a
potentially significant number of workers who leave our sample may enter
the informal sector. The informal sector has traditionally been thought of as
an employer of last resort, in which workers earn lower wages and experience
inferior working conditions. Maloney challenges this view for Latin Amer-
ica generally and for Mexico in particular.28 He shows that workers who
become self-employed in the informal sector often earn 25 percent higher
wages, on average, than they did as salaried workers in the formal sector.
Salaried workers in the informal sector, however, always earn less than their
formal sector counterparts. This result suggests that there is no clear pre-
sumption of bias, or, more specifically, the direction of a bias from not being
able to account for informal sector employment is unclear. In the empirical
section below, we address this potential bias by comparing results across
samples that include and exclude workers who drop out of our sample.
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26. The official data are from www.imss.gob.mx/ventunica/memoria_2001/2/024000.htm.
A table showing this comparison is available on request.
27. Our data cover all economic sectors and are classified using a four-digit industry
code that is similar, but not identical, to the U.S. 1987 SIC code.
28. Maloney (2004).
We analyze employee-level records for the period 1993 to 2000, mea-
suring wages on 31 March, 30 June, 30 September, and 31 December of
each year. This yields thirty-two quarters of data. While the period is deter-
mined by data availability, it is a particularly interesting time in which to
study displacement because it encompasses several reforms and macro-
economic events, including the implementation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and the December 1994 collapse
of the peso, which induced a serious recession that lasted until 1996.
The Mexican Economic Environment
In addition to the firm-worker identifier, the data also include details such
as geographic region, sector, and the gender and birth date (month and year)
of each worker. Regional heterogeneity in Mexico emerges as a result of
historical differences in production (centered on Mexico City), concentra-
tion of foreign investment in the U.S.-Mexican border region, and the per-
sistent poverty and lack of growth in southern Mexico. In particular,
Mexican regions have had very different experiences with adjustment.29
We therefore focus on four Mexican regions: the border, the north, central
Mexico, and the south.30
The simple model presented earlier suggests that differences in the con-
centration of economic activity can affect postdisplacement wages. Mexico
exhibits significant regional heterogeneity. Manufacturing is predomi-
nantly located in the border, north, and central regions. The highest rates of
employment growth and investment have been concentrated in the border
region, possibly as a result of maquiladora investment.31 The south, in con-
trast, concentrates on tourism (most notably in the state of Quintana Roo,
home of Cancún) and oil. While aggregate statistics suggest that manufac-
turing is similar in the border, north, and center regions, the regions are
actually quite different. Figure 2 (panel A) shows the evolution of per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) for each region over time. The central
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29. Conroy and West (2000).
30. We define the four regions as encompassing the following Mexican states: the bor-
der region: Baja California, Coahuila de Zaragoza, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sonora, and
Tamaulipas; the north: Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Durango, Guanajuato, Hidalgo,
Jalisco, Nayarit, Querétaro de Arteaga, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Veracruz-llave, and
Zacatecas; the central region: Distrito Federal, México, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala; and
the south: Campeche, Colima, Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacán de Ocampo, Oaxaca, Quintana
Roo, Tabasco, and Yucatán.
31. Feenstra and Hanson (1997); Robertson (2000).
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A. Per capita GDP
a
Thousands 1993 pesos
Percent
Year
Border North
Central South
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
14
19
24
29
34
a. The four lines represent GDP per capita for the different regions.  The GDP of each region is calculated as the sum of the real state GDP of 
all states in each region.  The population of each region in each year was calculated using a linear growth trend from data between the 1990 
and 2000 population censuses.  The real state GDP is in thousands of 1993 pesos.   The distribution of states into regions is identified in the text. 
b. Regional unemployment rates are the simple averages of city-level unemployment rates in each region, as identified in the text. 
Tic marks are at third quarter of given year. 
B. Unemployment rates
b
 
Time Period
 Border  North
 Central  South
1992q3 1993q3 1994q3 1995q3 1996q3 1997q3 1998q3 1999q3 2000q3 2001q3 2002q3
1.5
3
4.5
6
7.5
F I G U R E  2 . Regional Differences in per Capita GDP and Unemployment Rates
and border regions are much more economically dynamic than the north.
The central region has the largest amount of measured economic activity,
although it has the fewest states. The border and the north regions have sim-
ilar levels of total GDP, but GDP per capita is much higher in the border
region, suggesting that economic activity is more concentrated in the border
region than in the north. The border region also had a higher GDP growth
rate than the north for most of the sample period. All regions experienced a
sharp recession in 1995; the years following 1995 are recovery years. We
expect that, to be consistent with the model, postdisplacement wages would
generally be lower in the north than in the central and border regions.
The model also suggests that unemployment rates can affect postdis-
placement wages. Panel B of the figure presents regional unemployment
rates calculated as a simple average of the official urban unemployment for
the main cities in each state. The recession is especially evident here.
Unemployment rates are highest in the third quarter of 1995, and they fall
steadily in the third quarters of subsequent years in our sample. Unemploy-
ment rates track each other quite closely across regions, but the south tends
to have lower unemployment rates than the rest of the country. The north
has the highest peak unemployment rate. Prior to the collapse, the border
region had higher unemployment rates than other regions, but rates in the
border region fell faster than the rest of the country during the recovery
period. We expect that, to be consistent with the model, postdisplacement
wages would generally be lower for workers who separated during the
height of the recession.
In contrast, institutions (such as unions) and inequality differ very little
across regions in Mexico. Fairris and Levine find unionization rates for
1998 of 0.21 both in states that share a border with the United States and
in states that do not.32 In general, they find little heterogeneity in union-
ization rates across regions in Mexico. Inequality varies little across re-
gions, as well. As a measure of income inequality, we calculated the Gini
coefficient of the natural logarithm of the real daily wage (the wage mea-
sure used in the empirical work below) for each region in our data. In the
first quarter of 1993, the Gini coefficients for the border, north, central,
and south regions were 0.424, 0.422, 0.422, and 0.439, respectively.33
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32. Fairris and Levine (2004).
33. For the first quarter of 1991, the Gini coefficients were, in the same order, 0.406,
0.409, 0.419, and 0.405. The regional Gini coefficients generally track each other closely
over time, rising after Mexico’s entrance into GATT and then leveling off when NAFTA
went into effect. See Robertson (2004) for further discussion of Mexican wage inequality.
These rates are much more similar to each other than they are to the Gini
coefficients of France, Germany, and the United States.
Description of Comparison Groups and Definition of Displaced Workers
We divide our sample of approximately 80 million observations in several
ways. Given the overwhelming size of the data set, we focus on workers
displaced between the third and fourth quarters of 1995, 1996, and 1997.
These periods match three possibly distinct conditions: high unemploy-
ment (1995), sharply falling unemployment (1996), and relatively low and
stabilizing unemployment (1997). These three displacement periods also
maximize the time necessary to identify wage movements before and after
displacement.
The issues related to defining displaced workers are widely discussed
in the literature. Administrative data, such as those used by Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan, generally do not include direct information on the
cause of separation. The cause of separation is important because workers
who leave voluntarily are more likely to have more positive economic pros-
pects beyond their current firm. Including voluntary separations would
therefore bias the estimated effects of displacement upwards.
To get a sense of the magnitude of voluntary and involuntary displace-
ment, we draw from the National Urban Employment Survey (Encuesta
Nacional de Empleo Urbano, or ENEU). This household survey is like the
U.S. Current Population Survey in that it is used to calculate measures of
unemployment. The survey contains a question that can be used to deter-
mine whether a worker separated voluntarily or involuntarily from the firm.
The average responses over time are shown in figure 3. Two facts are
immediately apparent. First, workers in Mexico are more likely to leave
their firm involuntarily than voluntarily, which might suggest a high vol-
untary separation cost for workers. Second, the rate of involuntary (vol-
untary) separation is highest (lowest) during the three years on which we
focus (1995, 1996, and 1997). These rates follow the business cycle (they
are consistent with figure 2, panel B) and suggest that our focus years are
the least susceptible to selection bias.34
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34. Gonzaga (2003) suggests that workers may negotiate with firms to create the
impression that they were fired when they actually quit, in order to receive severance pay-
ments mandated by Brazilian labor law. Our Mexican data do not seem to exhibit the same
kinds of patterns (for example, the cyclicality of separations) that this phenomenon appar-
ently causes in Brazil.
We follow previous studies in our attempt to minimize this bias by
focusing on workers who left firms with significant contractions. We cre-
ated two samples to identify displaced workers. We first identified firms
that contracted more than 60 percent between the third and fourth quarters
of the reference year, from an initial employment of 50 or more workers.
Our second sample uses a 30 percent contraction threshold. We labeled
these displacing firms.35 The logic behind this decision, which is well es-
tablished in the literature, is that workers leaving these distressed firms are
most likely to be immune from the selection bias that arises from volun-
tary separation.
We broke down each of the two samples into four subsamples of dis-
placed workers to examine the possible effects of tenure, sample attrition,
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35. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a) label all firms that contract more than 
30 percent from an early sample average as contracting firms.
Time Period
 Involuntary Separation Rate  Voluntary Separation Rate
87.1 89.1 91.1 93.1 95.1 97.1 99.1 01.1
8
16
24
32
40
48
56
64
72
80
a. Separation rates are calculated based on the Mexican quarterly Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano.  The two rates do not add up 
to 100 because we excluded separation resulting from injury and other exogeneous factors.  
F I G U R E  3 . Separation Rates by Motivea
age, and sector changes. To focus on the effects of tenure, we restricted our
sample to workers who were in the displacing firm for the entire period up
until the displacement event, left the firm at the time of displacement,
found work in another firm either immediately or after spending some time
out of our sample, and then worked in one firm until the end of the sam-
ple period. We refer to this group as C1. Workers who are out of the sam-
ple may be either unemployed or working in the informal sector.36 Since
we cannot distinguish between these two conditions, we created another
subsample of displaced workers who found jobs immediately after the dis-
placement event and then remained employed for the rest of the sample.
We label this group C2. Our third group comprises workers who worked
at the same (displacing) firm for less than two years prior to displacement
and then worked at one firm following displacement (C3); these workers
may not be in the sample for the entire period. This short-tenure criterion
contrasts directly with the long-tenure criterion for workers in the first
group. The final group consists of workers who worked at one firm prior
to displacement, are in the sample in all periods, but may have worked at
several firms following displacement (C4).
We contrast the wage patterns of these workers against two compari-
son groups. Employees in the first group (A) worked in every quarter at
firms that did not experience large contractions in any quarter during our
period of study. Given the large size of the data set, we selected these
workers from a 1 percent sample of all workers in nondisplacing firms.
For 1995, our sample of this group begins with 3.87 million observations,
or about 121,000 per quarter. The second group (B) consists of workers
who worked at a displacing firm in every period of the sample (that is,
workers in displacing firms who remain with the firm after the displace-
ment event).37
About 18 percent of the observations represent multiple firms per worker
in each quarter. This could be due to the fact that workers could hold sev-
eral formal sector jobs, change jobs frequently within the quarter, or are
not coded correctly. The problem of multiple jobs becomes slightly more
serious when considering displacement because being displaced from your
second job may not have the same implications as being displaced from
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36. See appendix A for a discussion of the age differences of those who are displaced
and those who leave the sample.
37. Since we want to compare the wages of workers who remain in displacing plants,
we omit plants that shut down completely.
your primary job. Since we do not have data on hours, it is difficult to
determine which is the primary job, which entries are errors, and which
entries represent changing jobs. We therefore drop all workers with mul-
tiple observations per quarter from the sample.
We impose additional sample restrictions. We restrict the sample to
workers between fifteen (in the first year) and seventy-one years of age (in
the last year), those with positive earnings, and those who are not missing
sectoral information. We also restrict the sample to those who are not
missing any geographic data.
Summary Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 contain summary statistics for the 1995 ABC1 and ABC2
samples (that is, samples covering groups A, B, and either C1 or C2) by
sector and region. The “1995 sample” refers to the sample for the 1995 dis-
placement event and contains observations for every quarter between 1993
and 2000. The summary statistics in tables 1 and 2 summarize data for
1996 from these samples. Our measure of wages is the natural log of the
real daily wage.38 Several interesting results emerge. Workers are gener-
ally youngest in the central and border regions, and wages are lowest in the
border. The border and the north have higher employment shares in man-
ufacturing than in services.
Table 3 disaggregates the A, B, and C components of the sample and
compares the sample summary statistics before and after the 1995 dis-
placement event by summarizing the data for 1994 and 1996. The table
shows that the wages of all workers fell between 1994 and 1996. Interest-
ingly, the average wages of workers who remained in displacing firms fell
by more than workers who were displaced.
One potential concern is that the ages of displaced workers and work-
ers who left the sample affect our results. Appendix A formally compares
the ages of workers in each subsample and those who leave our data. This
comparison reveals two main results. First, for workers who remained in
the sample, there is no statistical difference between workers who were
displaced and workers who remained in displacing firms in the 1995 and
1996 sample (workers who remained in displacing firms were, on average,
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38. We converted nominal wages to real wages using the national-level consumer price
index available at www.banxico.org, based on the index values corresponding to the month
of observation.
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T A B L E  1 . Summary Statistics for the ABC1 Displacement Sample, 1995:3 to 1995:4a
Sector and summary
Geographic region
statistic Border North Central South Total
Agriculture
Wage 2.94 2.87 2.80 2.46 2.84
Age 37.51 37.52 39.51 44.2 38.46
Percent female 8.79 13.11 10.59 18.78 12.1
No. observations 2,674 3,096 236 905 6,911
Mining
Wage 3.34 3.36 3.04 3.63 3.40
Age 33.62 35.06 36.92 35.79 34.66
Percent female 1.94 1.8 11.11 2.96 2.4
No. observations 1,029 778 72 540 2,419
Manufacturing
Wage 3.25 3.52 3.39 3.47 3.42
Age 30.4 33.18 33.63 32.69 32.74
Percent female 33.04 29.89 29.61 17.67 29.36
No. observations 22,455 45,223 36,741 9,909 114,328
Transport equipment
Wage 3.50 3.61 3.86 . . . 3.65
Age 29.4 32.72 33.64 . . . 31.65
Percent female 28.03 14.91 10.2 . . . 18.77
No. observations 2,472 1,254 2,107 0 5,834
Construction
Wage 3.21 3.23 3.20 3.46 3.26
Age 35.81 33.89 33.82 35.05 34.79
Percent female 3.05 2.78 11.62 9.01 5.33
No. observations 15,042 12,888 5,997 8,033 41,960
Utilities
Wage 4.03 4.32 4.15 3.96 4.18
Age 38 39.51 39.01 38.36 39.02
Percent female 14.44 16 12.6 12.59 14.25
No. observations 561 2,025 1,619 588 4,793
Services
Wage 3.20 3.35 3.49 3.32 3.37
Age 35.38 36.09 34.81 36.04 35.49
Percent female 35.75 42.42 39.76 42.19 40.28
No. observations 19,492 35,706 42,777 17,636 115,611
Total
Wage 3.23 3.42 3.45 3.38 3.38
Age 33.58 34.57 34.33 35.17 34.36
Percent female 24.91 29.66 32.43 27.06 29.14
No. observations 63,725 100,970 89,549 37,612 291,856
. . . No observations in this category.
a. Data are for 1996.
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T A B L E  2 . Summary Statistics for the ABC2 Displacement Sample, 1995:3 to 1995:4a
Sector and summary 
Geographic region
statistic Border North Central South Total
Agriculture
Wage 2.89 2.71 2.79 2.39 2.66
Age 40.21 41.33 44 45.72 42.53
Percent female 14.49 13.31 7.32 18.33 14.63
No. observations 552 1,052 164 720 2,488
Mining
Wage 3.70 3.49 3.28 3.92 3.67
Age 37.59 36.75 38.71 34.81 36.58
Percent female 3.41 1.01 14.29 1.47 2.29
No. observations 352 396 28 272 1,048
Manufacturing
Wage 3.63 3.79 3.70 3.70 3.71
Age 33.94 35.76 37.73 36.28 36.11
Percent female 32.79 25.82 24.8 17.31 26.36
No. observations 8,344 12,020 13,500 2,888 36,752
Transport equipment
Wage 3.77 3.84 4.18 . . . 3.94
Age 30.93 33.5 35.94 . . . 33.27
Percent female 35.73 14.68 7.21 . . . 21.54
No. observations 1,500 436 1,276 0 3,212
Construction
Wage 3.45 3.38 3.74 4.02 3.62
Age 39.22 35.32 34.19 36.54 36.09
Percent female 14.56 7.78 7.69 47.77 17.34
No. observations 632 1,028 780 628 3,068
Utilities
Wage 4.16 4.04 4.27 4.01 4.16
Age 39.79 39.83 40.37 40.4 40.13
Percent female 17.27 20.97 6.95 14.12 13.32
No. observations 440 744 1,208 340 2,732
Services
Wage 3.55 3.38 3.81 3.48 3.58
Age 38.33 38 38.15 37.84 38.09
Percent female 44.8 45.72 39.7 48.66 43.79
No. observations 7,884 13,936 15,112 5,540 42,472
Total
Wage 3.59 3.55 3.79 3.53 3.64
Age 36.01 37.08 37.91 37.88 37.23
Percent female 35.85 33.5 29.94 35.43 32.98
No. observations 19,704 29,612 32,068 10,388 91,772
. . . No observations in this category.
a. Data are for 1996.
1.32 years older than displaced workers in 1997). The point estimates
suggest that workers displaced in 1995 and 1996 were slightly older than
workers who remained in displacing firms. Second, workers who left the
sample were younger than those who remained in the sample. Other stud-
ies suggest that workers in Mexico often leave the formal sector to become
entrepreneurs in the informal sector.39 Since risk is often associated with
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39. Maloney (1998, 2004); Maloney and Krebs (1999).
T A B L E  3 . Descriptive Statistics by Displacement Status before and after Displacement Eventa
Year before displacement (1994) Year after displacement (1996)
Statistic A B C1 C2 A B C1 C2
Wage 3.820 4.189 3.541 3.907 3.569 3.854 3.278 3.607
(0.829) (0.806) (0.785) (0.774) (0.854) (0.848) (0.737) (0.804)
Age 35.962 33.519 33.042 34.301 37.962 35.519 33.134 36.301
(9.902) (9.311) (10.641) (9.455) (9.902) (9.311) (10.474) (9.455)
Percent female 0.349 0.299 0.342 0.248 0.349 0.299 0.273 0.248
(0.477) (0.458) (0.474) (0.432) (0.477) (0.458) (0.446) (0.432)
Agriculture 0.035 0.002 0.018 0.019 0.035 0.002 0.023 0.042
(0.184) (0.047) (0.133) (0.135) (0.184) (0.047) (0.149) (0.202)
Mining 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.000 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.000
(0.107) (0.117) (0.088) (0.000) (0.107) (0.117) (0.081) (0.000)
Manufacturing 0.330 0.640 0.319 0.207 0.330 0.640 0.382 0.192
(0.470) (0.480) (0.466) (0.405) (0.470) (0.480) (0.486) (0.394)
Transport equipment 0.049 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.049 0.007 0.013 0.000
(0.216) (0.081) (0.101) (0.000) (0.216) (0.081) (0.112) (0.000)
Construction 0.012 0.049 0.179 0.074 0.012 0.049 0.194 0.193
(0.109) (0.216) (0.383) (0.261) (0.109) (0.216) (0.396) (0.395)
Utilities 0.038 0.014 0.008 0.001 0.038 0.014 0.010 0.002
(0.192) (0.119) (0.087) (0.036) (0.192) (0.119) (0.100) (0.045)
Services 0.524 0.274 0.459 0.699 0.524 0.274 0.372 0.570
(0.499) (0.446) (0.498) (0.459) (0.499) (0.446) (0.483) (0.495)
Border 0.263 0.103 0.181 0.145 0.263 0.103 0.218 0.145
(0.441) (0.304) (0.385) (0.352) (0.441) (0.304) (0.413) (0.352)
North 0.271 0.468 0.374 0.284 0.271 0.468 0.355 0.288
(0.445) (0.499) (0.484) (0.451) (0.445) (0.499) (0.478) (0.453)
Central 0.369 0.255 0.305 0.523 0.369 0.255 0.294 0.519
(0.482) (0.436) (0.460) (0.500) (0.482) (0.436) (0.456) (0.500)
South 0.097 0.174 0.140 0.048 0.097 0.174 0.133 0.048
(0.295) (0.379) (0.347) (0.213) (0.295) (0.379) (0.340) (0.213)
No. observations 62,260 23,480 251,313 6,032 62,260 23,480 206,116 6,032
a. Displacement occurred between 1995:3 and 1995:4. The groups are defined as follows: group A: workers who are not in displacing
firms and remain in the same firm; group B: workers who are in displacing firms but do not separate from displacing firms; group C1:
workers who are in displacing firms, separate from those firms, and are not necessarily employed in every period in the sample; and
group C2: workers who are in displacing firms, separate from those firms, and are employed in every period in the sample. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
youth, our results seem to be consistent with the idea that when displaced,
young workers may find the informal sector attractive and therefore re-
main out of our sample.
Table 3 also shows that sample ABC2 is balanced, but ABC1 is not,
since workers in C1 are allowed to exit and return to the sample after the
displacement event. When we consider only a balanced panel of workers,
the average age of all workers is two years higher in the later period. The
table also shows that displaced workers who found a job right away were
most likely to be male, while the difference in the percent of females in C1
and C2 suggests that workers who were displaced and exited the sample
were more likely to be female.
The table also includes information about the sectoral distribution of
each group in each period (the sum over the sectors in each column
equals one hundred percent). Since workers who did not change firms
did not change sectors, the sectoral distribution of the first two groups
remains constant. One might expect that the sectoral distribution of the
two groups of workers who were in displacing firms would be identical,
but we restrict the sample to workers who were employed in every period.
Therefore, differences in the sectoral distribution between the second two
groups reflect the differences in future employment patterns. In our sam-
ple, no workers who were displaced from transportation equipment or
mining remained in those sectors when they were displaced. They could
be excluded from the sample as a result of extended search times or they
could have moved to other sectors, such as construction or agriculture.
The percent of displaced workers in construction and agriculture more
than doubles following displacement (for workers who immediately
found employment).
Regional differences in displacement patterns are also evident in table 3.
The majority of employment is in the central region, but so are most of the
displaced workers who immediately found jobs. The north has the highest
share of workers who either were in displacing firms and did not leave or
were displaced and exited the sample at some point. This may be consis-
tent with the shift in production from the central region to the north, as
described by Hanson.40 On the other hand, the overall regional pattern of
employment in table 3 displays a large degree of stability, suggesting that
few workers who were displaced in a particular region moved to other
regions in the very short run to begin other jobs.
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40. Hanson (1998).
Empirical Approach
To maximize comparability with studies in developed countries, we employ
the methodological gold standard established by Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan.41 We first define displacement indicators as Djit, which equals
one if the worker separated from a displacing firm (and zero otherwise) to
compare the wages of displaced workers with all other workers. After pre-
senting these initial results below, we redefine the displacement indicator
to identify workers in each of three groups ( j = 1, 2, 3). The first variable
takes on the value of one for workers who were not in displacing firms, and
zero otherwise (group A). The second takes on a value of one for workers
in displacing firms who remained with the same firm, and zero otherwise
(group B). The third variable takes on a value of one if the workers left
firms that contracted more than 60 percent in the quarter in which they sep-
arated (that is, they are in one of the C samples). We estimate each aggre-
gated sample separately (ABC1, ABC2, and so forth). We begin with the
following specification.
The dependent variable is the natural log of the real wage, which is cal-
culated by adjusting the nominal wages variable by the Mexican national
consumer price index using 1994 as the base year. The ai term captures
individual-specific fixed effects that take on a value of one for each indi-
vidual in the sample. The parameter γt represents time-specific effects.
Each estimated equation includes a dummy variable for each quarter-year
(for thirty-one of thirty-two periods, omitting the first quarter in the sam-
ple). The vector xit represents other time-varying characteristics of work-
ers, including age. We also include the indicator for the individual’s
displacement group status, excluding the workers not in displacing firms
as a control group. We then interact the time effects with the displacement
group indicators to compare wages in each group before and after the dis-
placement event. We estimate this equation separately for each of the four
geographic regions in our sample.42
By fully interacting displacement status with the time effects (dummy
variables for each quarter), we allow the time trend for displaced workers
( ) .1  w a D Dit i t jj ji ji itt jt itj= + + + + +∑ ∑∑γ β ϑ γ δ εxit
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41. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b).
42. We estimate separate equations for each region because the sample sizes are so
large.
to differ from the time trend for nondisplaced workers. These differential
time trends are identified off differences over time in wage changes between
displaced workers and nondisplaced workers. We would expect, for exam-
ple, that wage changes over time would be fairly similar for displaced
workers and nondisplaced workers before the displacement event, but that
wage changes would begin to differ sharply after the displacement event.
This is, in fact, what we normally observe.43
Results
We begin by estimating equation 1 by ordinary least squares (OLS) for
each region. All but thirteen of the 124 estimated marginal effects of the
displacement x time variables (thirty-one coefficients for each of four
regions) for sample ABC1 are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. The R2 are all 0.90 or higher. A nearly identical pattern of signifi-
cance emerges for sample ABC2.44 The standard errors are generally very
small. Since we are particularly concerned about the pattern of the relative
wages of displaced workers’ wages over time, however, a graphical pre-
sentation may more effectively facilitate comparisons across years and
sectors.45 Figures 4 and 5 graph the estimated coefficients for the 1995,
1996, and 1997 displacement samples. The patterns of standard errors and
diagnostic statistics are similar for the other years.46
As in Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, wages in all periods and all re-
gions fell prior to displacement; in contrast with Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan, no region exhibits a sharp drop in wages at the time of dis-
placement.47 Figures 4 and 5 do show significant effects of displacement,
but these effects vary by region and time of displacement. Figure 4, for
example, reveals that workers who were displaced in 1995, the trough of
the recession, did worse than other workers. Workers displaced in later
years, however, recovered. The heterogeneity across time is especially
evident in the central and border regions. Workers in the relatively poor
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43. We are required to use some normalization for both time trends. For both displaced
workers and nondisplaced workers, we set the coefficient equal to zero for the dummy vari-
able corresponding to nine quarters before the (potential) displacement event.
44. The tables are available on request.
45. Appendix B provides a more extensive evaluation of statistical significance and
standard errors.
46. These results are also available on request.
47. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b).
north show few effects of displacement and fewer of recovery. While the
wage trends in the border and central regions become positive at the time
of displacement, wage trends remain flat in the north and (to a lesser
degree) the south.
The second important message emerging from figures 4 and 5 is that
the effects of being displaced in 1995 seem to be permanent, or at least
long-lasting. That is, there is little evidence of recovery over the sample
period. This is especially true in the border and central regions. The re-
sults of being displaced at times of peak unemployment are therefore sim-
ilar to the findings of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan.48 Being displaced
at different times generates different results that include positive post-
displacement wages.
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48. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b).
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
Border
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
North
Central
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
South
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
a. The sample is defined as workers who were in the displacing firm for the entire period up until the displacement event, left the 
firm at the time of displacement, found work in another firm either immediately or after spending some time out of our sample, and 
then worked in one firm until the end of the sample period (sample ABC1 in the text).  Estimated coefficients of the time x displacement 
status effects for displaced workers are from equation 1. Groups A and B were both omitted, so these coefficient estimates represent the 
difference between the wages of displaced workers and all other workers in the sample.  The reference time period is nine quarters prior 
to the displacement event for each sample. 
F I G U R E  4 . Effects of Displacement by Region: Sample ABC1a
The differences between figures 4 and 5 suggest that workers who may
not be in the sample in all periods may suffer more serious repercussions
from displacement than other workers. In general, workers who were em-
ployed immediately did better than workers who were out of the sample
for any length of time. The difference between 1995 and 1996 becomes
more pronounced in the north and somewhat less pronounced in other re-
gions when we focus on those in the sample in all periods. Even workers
who were employed immediately in the north continued to experience
falling wages, whereas workers in the dynamic central and border regions
did much better when employed immediately.
Figures 4 and 5 compare the wages of displaced workers with all other
workers, which allows us to compare our results with other studies in the
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Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
Border
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
North
Central
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
South
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
 a. The sample is defined as workers who were in the displacing firm for the entire period up until the displacement event, left the 
firm at the time of displacement, found work in another firm immediately (that is, they spent no time out of our sample), and then 
worked in one firm until the end of the sample period (sample ABC2 in the text).  Estimated coefficients of the time x displacement 
status effects for displaced workers are from equation 1. Groups A and B were both omitted, so these coefficient estimates represent the 
difference between the wages of displaced workers and all other workers in the sample.  The reference time period is nine quarters prior 
to the displacement event for each sample.  The omitted category is workers who were not in displacing firms and remained in the same 
firm for the entire sample. 
F I G U R E  5 . Effects of Displacement by Region: Sample ABC2a
literature. We can also divide the comparison groups into nonseparating
workers who are in distressed firms and those who are not in distressed
firms. Figure 6 contains the results from the comparison of displaced work-
ers with workers who remain in contracting firms for the entire sample.49
The main result of this comparison is that workers who were displaced
experienced large wage gains relative to workers who remained in dis-
tressed firms. In nearly every region and every time period, workers who
separated from distressed firms experienced higher wages relative to
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A. Sample BC1
a
 
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
Border
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
North
Central
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
South
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
a. The sample is defined as workers who were in the displacing firm for the entire period up until the displacement event, left the 
firm at the time of displacement, found work in another firm either immediately or after spending some time out of our sample, and 
then worked in one firm until the end of the sample period (sample ABC1 in the text).  Estimated coefficients of the time x displacement 
status effects for displaced workers are from equation 1. Group B was omitted, so these coefficient estimates represent the difference 
between the wages of displaced workers who remained in the displacing firm.  The reference time period is nine quarters prior to the 
displacement event for each sample.   
F I G U R E  6 . Effects of Displacement by Region Relative to Workers Who Remained 
in the Firm
49. The results from comparisons with workers in nondisplacing firms only are very
similar to those described above, so we do not discuss them in detail.
(continued )
workers who stayed behind. This result is consistent with the model pre-
sented earlier (specifically, regions II and III of figure 1).
The second result that emerges from figure 6 is that many of the pat-
terns described in the analysis of figures 4 and 5 remain: wages fall prior
to displacement and the long-run effects of being displaced in 1995 are
less positive than the effects of being displaced in recovery years. Dis-
placement in the border and central regions is followed by higher wages
than in the north and south. Workers displaced in 1995 in the north and
south took much longer to recover than their counterparts in the border
and central regions. As the economy recovered, so did the prospects of
displaced workers.
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B. Sample BC2
b
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
Border
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
North
Central
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
South
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
b. The sample is defined as workers who were in the displacing firm for the entire period up until the displacement event, left the 
firm at the time of displacement, found work in another firm immediately (that is, they spent no time out of our sample), and then 
worked in one firm until the end of the sample period (sample BC2 in the text).  Estimated coefficients of the time x displacement status 
effects for displaced workers are from equation 1. Group B was omitted, so these coefficient estimates represent the difference between 
the wages of displaced workers who remained in the displacing firm.  The reference time period is nine quarters prior to the 
displacement event for each sample.   
F I G U R E  6 . Effects of Displacement by Region Relative to Workers Who Remained 
in the Firm (Continued )
One of the findings in the current literature is that tenure increases the
adverse effects of displacement. To investigate the effects of tenure, we
created a sample similar to the first except that we dropped all workers
with more than two years tenure in the displacing firm. We performed the
same empirical exercise using this sample and present the results in fig-
ure 7. The results in panels A and B can be directly compared with the
results in figures 4 and 6 (panel A). Panel A of figure 7 suggests that
short-tenure workers did better than workers with longer tenure. This is
consistent with worker training and other hypotheses in the literature.
Short-tenure workers displaced in 1995, however, did worse than work-
ers displaced in 1996 and 1997 in the border and central regions, since the
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A. Sample ABC3a
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
Border
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
North
Central
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
South
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
a. The sample is defined as workers who may not have been in the sample for the entire period, who worked at the same 
(displacing) firm for less than two years prior to displacement, and then worked at one firm following displacement (sample ABC3 in the 
text).  This short tenure contrasts directly with the long tenure of workers in the first group.  Estimated coefficients of the time x 
displacement status effects for displaced workers are from equation 1. Groups A and B were both omitted, so these coefficient estimates 
represent the difference between the wages of displaced workers and all other workers in the sample.  The reference time period is nine 
quarters prior to the displacement event for each sample.  The omitted category is workers who were not in displacing firms and 
remained in the same firm for the entire sample. 
F I G U R E  7 . Effects of Displacement by Region: Short-Tenure Workers
(continued )
latter immediately earned higher wages and the former experienced a down-
ward trend in wages. Time of displacement also induces more heterogene-
ity in the northern region: short-tenure workers in the north who separated
in 1995 did much worse than long-tenure workers who displaced at the
same time.
Tenure does not seem to matter when comparing displaced and non-
displaced workers from displacing firms, in the sense that the overall re-
sults in figures 6 (panel A) and 7 (panel B) are very similar. Workers in all
periods and regions eventually did better than workers who stayed behind.
Workers displaced during recovery periods did the best in all regions, and
workers displaced in the border and central regions did better than work-
ers in the north and south regardless of tenure. Therefore, differences in
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B. Sample BC3
b
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
Border
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
North
Central
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
South
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
b. The sample is defined as workers who may not have been in the sample for the entire period, who worked at the same 
(displacing) firm for less than two years prior to displacement, and then worked at one firm following displacement (sample BC3 in the 
text). This short tenure contrasts directly with the long tenure of workers in the first group.  Estimated coefficients of the time x 
displacement status effects for displaced workers are from equation 1. Group B was omitted, so these coefficient estimates represent the 
difference between the wages of displaced workers who remained in the displacing firm.  The reference time period is nine quarters 
prior to the displacement event for each sample.   
F I G U R E  7 . Effects of Displacement by Region: Short-Tenure Workers (Continued )
the effects of displacement do not seem to be driven by tenure so much as
by local labor market conditions.
Figure 8 presents our results for the sample in which workers are allowed
to change firms several times following displacement but remain in the
sample. We focus on this sample because workers who switch more often
may have either lower search costs, which would suggest that their wages
would be higher, or less potential to accumulate firm-specific capital, which
would suggest that their wages would be lower. The results in panels A
and B of the figure suggest that, generally, workers who switch more often
may be no less susceptible to the effects of the time of displacement than
workers who switch less often. In fact, the results are almost identical to
figures 5 and 6 (panel B), respectively, which implies that the results are
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A. Sample ABC4
a
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
Border
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
North
Central
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
South
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
a. The sample is defined as workers who worked in one firm prior to displacement, were in the sample in all periods, and may have 
worked at several firms following displacement (sample ABC4 in the text).  Estimated coefficients of the time x displacement status 
effects for displaced workers are from equation 1. Groups A and B were both omitted, so these coefficient estimates represent the 
difference between the wages of displaced workers and all other workers in the sample.  The reference time period is nine quarters prior 
to the displacement event for each sample.  The omitted category is workers who were not in displacing firms and remained in the same 
firm for the entire sample. 
F I G U R E  8 . Effects of Displacement by Region: Postdisplacement Movers
(continued )
not driven by the restriction that workers stay in the same firm for the
remainder of the sample. Overall, the regional and temporal heterogeneity
seem to matter more than the worker’s switching cost.
One of our concerns about displacement is that workers may lose spe-
cific human capital. This problem may increase with the degree of change
a worker experiences from the original position. To consider some of the
potential effects of the loss of such capital, we differentiated the effects
of displacement for workers who remained in the same two-digit sector
and those who changed sectors. To isolate the comparison, we focused on
sample ABC4, which is the sample in which workers are observed for all
periods but may change firms more than once following displacement. We
then created an indicator variable based on whether the worker changed
sectors at the time of displacement. The results are presented in figure 9.
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B. Sample BC4
b
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
Border
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
North
Central
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
South
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
b. The sample is defined as workers who worked in one firm prior to displacement, were in the sample in all periods, and may have 
worked at several firms following displacement (sample BC4 in the text).  Estimated coefficients of the time x displacement status 
effects for displaced workers are from equation 1. Group B was omitted, so these coefficient estimates represent the difference between 
the wages of displaced workers who remained in the displacing firm.  The reference time period is nine quarters prior to the 
displacement event for each sample. 
F I G U R E  8 . Effects of Displacement by Region: Postdisplacement Movers (Continued )
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A. Workers who changed two-digit sectors
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
B. Workers who did not change two-digit sectors
Quarters from Displacement
 1995  1996
 1997
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
-.3
-.15
0
.15
.3
.45
.6
F I G U R E  9 . Sectoral Effects of Displacement
Panel A compares workers who change sectors and all other workers, while
panel B compares workers who remain in the same sector and all other
workers. For these regressions, we pooled all of the regions and controlled
for region-specific effects using regional dummy variables.
As in previous studies, our results suggest that Mexican workers experi-
ence some loss to capital from changing sectors or, perhaps more precisely,
a gain from remaining in the same sector. Workers who changed sectors at
the time of displacement do not seem that much different from other work-
ers for the majority of the sample. Displaced workers who remained in the
same sector, however, follow a pattern similar to those workers in previous
samples. Wages fell prior to displacement, and rose following displace-
ment if the workers were displaced after 1995.
As an additional robustness check, we considered all of the samples and
results described above using a contraction of 30 percent, rather than 60 per-
cent, as our criterion for identifying displacing firms. If selection bias
severely affects our sample, then the bias would be larger with firms under
the 30 percent contraction criterion, because workers leaving firms that
contract by 30 percent would probably include a higher proportion of vol-
untary separations. These results are nearly identical numerically and qual-
itatively to the results presented above.50 We find no evidence of a rising
problem of selection bias when we expand the sample. This may be due to
the fact that we include individual-specific fixed effects in all of the regres-
sions, and these effects may effectively be capturing unobserved charac-
teristics that are correlated with ability and other features that could drive
selection bias. This result, along with the fact that we follow established
approaches designed to minimize selection bias, leads us to believe that
selection bias does not significantly drive our results.
Conclusions
Given limited resources and a desire to support displaced workers, policy-
makers could increase the efficiency of support programs if they targeted
aid when and where it is needed most. Studies on the effects of displace-
ment on wages have generated a wide range of results, but they do little
theoretically or empirically to formally explain the underlying sources of
this heterogeneity. Previous studies suggest that differences in institutions,
50. The results are available on request.
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inequality, or labor market conditions might explain the results, but no study
that we are aware of compares these possibilities using matched worker-
firm data over time.
In this paper we examine the costs of displacement to workers using an
administrative data set that allows us to follow workers over thirty-two
quarters and four regions that vary significantly in labor market conditions.
By following an established empirical methodology to estimate postdisplace-
ment wages, we focus on the differences in institutions, inequality, and
labor market conditions in a single study in an attempt to understand the
difference in results.
Several findings emerge. First, our results exhibit the same heterogeneity
found in the current literature. We find a range of postdisplacement experi-
ences from negative (such as those documented by Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan) to positive (such as those documented in Kuhn).51 Since inequal-
ity and institutions (unions) are similar throughout Mexico but the empir-
ical results vary through time and space, we therefore conclude that our
analysis provides little support, if any, for the institutional explanation.
This conclusion is further backed by international comparisons. If national
institutions alone explained the differences in results between Germany
and the United States, we would expect to see little heterogeneity within
Mexico rather than the very wide range of results we find.52 Furthermore,
if France and Germany have positive postdisplacement because wages are
more compressed than in the United States, then we would expect the dis-
placement effects in Mexico to be mainly negative because Mexico’s
inequality is greater than that of the United States. Instead, we find much
heterogeneity in the results, with many instances of positive postdisplace-
ment wages.
We conclude that differences in local labor market conditions (over
both space and time) are most consistent with our results. We do find large,
negative, and lasting effects of displacement on wages for workers who
are displaced during times of high unemployment and in less economi-
cally active regions.53 Postdisplacement wage changes are typically zero
or positive in good times and in the most economically active regions. This
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51. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b); Kuhn (2002).
52. The difference in the results of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993b) and
Abbring and others (2002), which both focus on the United States, also weighs against the
institutional explanation.
53. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993b) find similar results.
is similar to recently documented patterns in France, Germany, and the
United States.
Our results are robust to changes in the definition of displaced worker.
For example, we consider the implications of displacement for workers
who may not be employed immediately following displacement, workers
who are employed after possibly being outside the labor force, workers with
different levels of tenure, and workers who change sectors. Our results are
generally consistent with other studies that focus on tenure and sectoral
changes. We also explore different reference groups and find strong and
consistent evidence that displaced workers earn significantly higher wages
than their coworkers that were left behind, which seems consistent with a
very simple theoretical model and Kuhn’s reminder that comparison group
matters.54
We also find that of our four regions (the border, the north, central
Mexico, and the south), the border region has the displacement wage pat-
tern most like that of the United States. Other studies have shown that
labor markets in this region are the most integrated with the United States,
so this similarity may not be surprising. The main example of this is the
decline in wages prior to displacement documented by Jacobson, LaLonde,
and Sullivan.55 This feature is not present in all regions or at all times of
displacement in Mexico, but it emerges most frequently in Mexico’s border
region.
The main policy recommendation that emerges from our results is that
targeting aid to displaced workers during recessions and in less economi-
cally active areas has potentially significant efficiency gains. These work-
ers tend to suffer larger and more lasting adverse effects from displacement
than other workers, which suggests that targeted aid may be especially valu-
able. This recommendation clearly assumes that behavior does not change
with policy. But clearly, potential changes in behavior must be taken into
account when considering changes to policy.
Appendix A: Age, Displacement, and Attrition
We formally compared the ages of displaced workers and workers who
left our sample. We are concerned about any difference in age because it
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54. Kuhn (2002).
55. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b).
could affect our results through a sort of selectivity bias. If workers who
left the sample are systematically younger than the workers who stayed,
for example, then the remaining workers’ wages may appear higher sim-
ply because these were older workers with more experience.
The results illustrate several points. First, workers in displacing firms
are generally younger than workers in nondisplacing firms. The age of dis-
placed workers is not statistically different from that of workers who re-
mained in displacing firms for 1995 and 1996, although the point estimates
suggest that displaced workers were slightly older. In 1997, displaced
workers were younger than workers who remained in displacing firms, and
the difference (about 1.32 years) is statistically significant.
Second, we find that workers who left the sample were significantly
younger than workers who remained in the sample. As discussed in the
text, this seems to be consistent with other papers that find relatively high
rates of entrepreneurship in the informal sector. Our results may be biased
downwards (upwards) if these workers earn higher (lower) wages, on
average, than workers in the formal sector. These results are shown in
table A1.
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T A B L E  A 1 . Age Comparisons across Samplesa
Age
Explanatory variable 1995 1996 1997
Age and attrition
Always in sample 2.308 5.814 6.174
(0.215)** (0.129)** (0.146)**
Constant 32.503 30.937 30.313
(0.032)** (0.031)** (0.029)**
No. observations 112,032 116,437 136,321
R2 0.00 0.02 0.01
Age relative to displaced workers
All other workers 2.222 1.034 2.186
(0.207)** (0.140)** (0.152)**
In displaced firms −0.108 −0.171 1.324
(0.230) (0.183) (0.193)**
Constant 34.811 36.751 36.487
(0.191)** (0.116)** (0.130)**
No. observations 23,711 26,537 24,579
R2 0.01 0.00 0.01
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level; ** statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
We used two main approaches to address this issue. First, we included
age and individual-specific fixed effects in our wage regressions to control
for differences in age. Second, we explored the robustness of our results to
different samples. The basic patterns emerge in all samples, regardless of
how we control for experience or attrition. Changing samples affects the
absolute, but not the relative, magnitude of our results.
Appendix B: The Statistical Significance of the Differences
We undertook a simple analysis to determine whether the differences be-
tween regions and periods are statistically significant. Given our large sam-
ple sizes, the standard errors are generally quite small, suggesting that the
differences between regions and periods are often statistically significant.
For example, figure B1 graphs the 95 percent confidence intervals for the
estimates of the three periods (1995, 1996, and 1997) for the border region
graph in figure 4. The graph suggests that the differences across periods
are probably not statistically significant prior to displacement, but clear
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F I G U R E  B 1 . Ninety-Five Percent Confidence Intervals for the Border Region in Figure 4
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F I G U R E  B 2 . Ninety-Five Percent Confidence Intervals for Three Regions in the 1995
Sample in Figure 4
differences emerge after displacement. With regard to differences across
regions, figure B2 graphs the effects of displacement in 1995 for the bor-
der, north, and central regions from figure 4 with the 95 percent confidence
intervals. The differences between the lines again suggest that the differ-
ences between regions are statistically significant, especially in the post-
displacement period.
Comments
Naércio Menezes-Filho: This interesting paper on the costs of job dis-
placement in Mexico is commendable for several reasons. First, it deals
with an important issue, namely, the earnings trajectory of individuals who
change their jobs. While there is an established literature on this subject
for developed countries, studies on developing countries are scant, despite
the fact that most of the recent reforms that provoked labor reallocation
occurred in the latter, where the problems of poverty and inequality are
severe. Second, the paper addresses this issue using very good data—
essentially a census of private firms in the formal sector of the Mexican
economy—over a long period. Finally, the analysis is thorough, as the
authors submit their results to various robustness tests using different sub-
samples. The main drawback of the paper lies in the interpretation of the
results, as I detail below.
The paper does not fully distinguish among the different explanations
for the costs of displacement. It presents interesting graphical analyses of
the wage changes for different periods and regions of displacement, but it
offers very little formal statistical analysis as to whether these differences
are statistically significant (apart from two figures in appendix B). The
authors could have pooled the data and explicitly tested for differences in
the displacement effect across regions and periods or included indicators
of labor conditions at the time of displacement, such as regional unem-
ployment, directly in the regression. Moreover, institutions and inequality
may differ across regions in Mexico. Their explanatory power should be
tested as well, if the aim is to provide a formal test of the different ex-
planations for the displacement effect. It does not suffice to state that
inequality and institutions vary less within Mexico than across countries,
so they are not likely to be the main explanations for the different costs of
displacement.
The authors could also have spent more time interpreting the results,
since reconciling them with the theory is not straightforward. The model
235
predicts, for example, that postdisplacement wages should be lower in the
north than in the central and border regions, but figures 4 and B2 show
exactly the opposite, as wages fall by more in the border and central areas.
The results change completely in figure 5, where the panel sample is used,
(and again in figure 6, panel A), yet the authors do not present a fully con-
vincing explanation for these changes.
The main problem with the data is that, as in other studies, the authors
cannot distinguish between displacements and voluntary separations. As
figure 3 shows, the rate of involuntary displacements varies over time,
reaching its peak in 1995, when displacement seems to be most damaging
to the worker. Does this rate vary across regions, as well? This selection
problem could explain some of the variation in displacement effects doc-
umented in the paper. To minimize this selection problem, the authors focus
on workers from displacing firms, that is, firms that contracted more than
60 percent between the third and fourth quarters of a given year (30 per-
cent in another subsample). According to the authors, these workers are
less likely to have voluntarily separated from their firm than workers in
firms that did not implement such massive layoffs. But why were these
workers displaced instead of the workers who continued working at the
displacing firm? According to the model, the displaced workers were those
with expected wages above the new proposed wage. If this is the case, why
were their wages falling prior to displacement, as the various figures show?
Another question that deserves a more careful explanation is why prod-
uct and labor market conditions vary so much across regions and over time.
The paper does not investigate the reasons for such differences in any
detail. Do good firms and workers, for example, endogenously locate in the
border regions so as to enjoy its good prospects? Is this choice driven by
unobservables? In other words, an endogeneity problem may underlie the
differences in the displacement effect across regions.
In sum, this paper represents an important step toward better under-
standing the displacement problem in developing countries. The results as
a whole are very interesting, but they deserved a more careful explanation,
especially in view of the selection problems mentioned above.
Omar Arias: The paper discusses the impact of displacement (resulting
from layoffs or voluntary separation) on future earnings performance using
Mexican data. The topic is certainly of utmost relevance for Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean in light of the limited reform of overly protective job
regulations and the need for well-designed support for displaced workers.
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The paper provides an extensive and concise review of the literature in this
area and presents novel results that highlight the heterogeneous potential
earnings impacts of displacement depending on labor market conditions.
The paper will be useful for both researchers and policymakers to better
understand the role of factors mediating the impact of displacement on
earnings and factor these into policy design.
The paper uses a unique panel data set for a large sample of Mexican
workers registered in social security over a reasonably long period. The
authors discuss the methodological difficulties of isolating the impact of
displacement on future earnings. Three sets of issues merit special atten-
tion: the problems caused by omitted variables and self-selection (sample
composition biases); attrition or incomplete employment spells (censoring
biases); and the existence of heterogeneous impacts. The first two refer to
the inability to appropriately control for worker and firm characteristics
that may be correlated with both displacement probabilities and post-
displacement earnings, to the restriction to workers with social security
registration (that is, formal sector), and to the possibility that workers who
drop out of the sample may have different characteristics and earnings per-
formance than those who stay. The paper proposes several ways to address
these issues and discusses the implications for the robustness of the re-
sults. The third point relates to the fact that average postdisplacement earn-
ings may vary widely across workers depending on context-specific factors
and workers’ skills. The paper argues that the empirical results favor an
important role for varying labor market conditions over that of local insti-
tutions and inequality. I focus my comments on some questions for future
research with regard to the methodological approach and the robustness of
the empirical evidence to discern competing explanations of impacts.
Although not framed in this way, the paper deals with an impact evalua-
tion problem, in which the treatment effect corresponds to the change in
displaced workers’ earnings. The counterfactual is given by the change in
earnings that would have occurred had these workers not been displaced, and
it is approximated by the change in earnings of comparable nondisplaced
workers. This raises issues familiar from the impact evaluation literature:
identifying the parameter(s) of interest, whether the control (comparison)
groups are good proxies of the counterfactual, and validity of the identify-
ing assumptions. The recent evaluation literature highlights that alterna-
tive treatment (impact) parameters could be of interest, although they are
not always identifiable. For example, one may want to measure the aver-
age impact of displacement (the effect on any randomly selected worker),
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the average effect on the treated (the impact on formal workers actually
displaced), or a local average effect on the treated (the impact for workers
close to displacement thresholds, such as those fired first in a recession).1
These parameters have different interpretations and, more important, lead
to different implications regarding the impact of displacements. For exam-
ple, the latter parameter tends to capture impacts on marginal workers
(that is, those displaced at the margin during layoffs). These impacts may
depend on both observed skills (for example, human capital measures like
years of education or tenure) and unobserved skills (such as individual
ability or labor market connections). The parameter thus fails to fully cap-
ture the impact of large-scale layoffs such as those that would occur in
major recessions or economic restructuring. The paper analyzes multiple
treatment groups that seem to resemble local average impacts, and it is not
entirely clear that the estimated effects readily generalize to the impacts of
displacements of any size or to well-defined groups of workers. Conse-
quently, the results may have limited application for interventions targeted
to massive numbers of workers.
The question of the validity of comparison groups is fundamental to the
results. Lacking other identifying restrictions, this boils down to whether
earnings trends prior to displacement were the same in the displaced
(treated) and nondisplaced (control) samples. The paper does not explic-
itly discuss this identifying condition. It does not seem to hold for all of
the displaced samples considered since wages decline prior to displace-
ment in some regions or periods. If these trends were not matched in the
corresponding comparison groups of nondisplaced workers, it would raise
questions of possible biases arising from dissimilar composition of the sam-
ples (that is, differences in worker characteristics across groups) or mean
reversion (in which earnings eventually move back towards their mean). It
would be useful for future work to discuss these issues in detail.
The paper maintains that the results support a greater role for labor mar-
ket conditions in mediating the impacts of displacements vis-à-vis other
factors such as labor institutions and inequality. While well argued and
suggestive, this claim deserves further exploration in future studies. First,
the reported similarity of inequality levels within Mexico does not con-
form to results from other studies that find significant differences in in-
equality levels across Mexican regions.2 The reported Gini coefficients are
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1. For a clear exposition of this, see Moffitt (1999).
2. See, for example, Andalón-López and López-Calva (2002).
obtained from the sample of formal sector workers under study (who are
likely to have equally dispersed earnings across regions), while the rele-
vant statistics should cover the entire local labor markets. Second, varying
regional capacities to enforce labor legislation may lead to de facto re-
gional differences in relevant regulations. Finally, it is ultimately difficult
to separate labor market conditions (outcomes), such as unemployment,
from the characteristics of labor institutions. For example, differences in
the enforcement of regulations that prescribe high severance payments or
nonwage benefits correlate with differences in the rates of unemployment
or informal employment.
Thus the reported variation in displacement effects across regions and
time does not support definitively disregarding the potential role of
inequality and institutions in mediating the impacts of displacement.
Future empirical research should delve further into the questions raised by
the new results of the paper and their implications for informing the design
of policies to better balance protection against job loss and more flexible
labor regulations in the region.
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